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JUDGE RAGGI:  Good morning. 
Everyone knows that we are here this morning for what is an important 
part of the work of the Privacy Subcommittee of the Judicial Conference 
Standing Committee on the Federal Rules. 
Just to give you a little background on that work, the federal courts, 
obviously, are engaged in the public’s business, and so the presumption is 
that our work, including our files, are open to the public.  There are many 
reasons informing that presumption.  Open files are important to the 
litigants who are involved in the cases before us.  Open files are important 
to the public’s oversight of the courts’ work.  Public access is also 
important to history.  There is much that can be learned about a society 
from the work of its courts; from the concerns that prompt individuals to 
seek assistance in the courts. 
All of these reasons have led the judiciary to presume that our files would 
be open.  But increasingly, there have been concerns voiced about 
unnecessary disclosures of private information in court files.  Some of these 
are not new.  There has always been a concern about information disclosed 
in court files that could actually facilitate other criminal conduct.  
Identification information, such as Social Security numbers, that could be 
used as part of identity theft or information about individuals cooperating 
with government investigations, who, because they are helping to target 
individuals involved in crimes, could find themselves targeted by criminals. 
There has also been a general concern about whether a high loss of 
privacy for litigants in the court will prompt people not to use the courts as 
a means of resolving their disputes.  As history teaches us, a society where 
people do not think they can resolve their disputes in a court is a society 
where they find some other means to do so, not always positive.  So we face 
these competing concerns of public access and protection of privacy. 
The Federal Rules already provide for protection of privacy in many 
respects.  And those are relatively recent rules.  Nevertheless, the last 
decade’s experience with greater public access on the Internet to court files 
has sharpened our understanding of privacy concerns.  So in 2009 or 
thereabouts, the chairman of the Standing Committee on the Federal Rules, 
Lee Rosenthal, who I am so pleased is here with us today, started to receive 
inquiries from members of Congress that seemed to deal with both of the 
matters I have addressed:  public access to the court.  Congress is concerned 
about whether we are going online fast enough and whether our access is 
broad enough to serve the public.  At the same time, Judge Rosenthal has 
received congressional inquiries about why we are not doing more to 
protect private material in these publicly available documents. 
So in the best traditions of all bureaucracies, a subcommittee was formed 
to study this matter.  This subcommittee is, of course, the one that is here 
today at Fordham. 
We operate as a subcommittee of the Standing Committee on the Federal 
Rules, but I really have to say that our efforts represent a joint endeavor by 
both the Standing Committee and the Committee on Court Administration 
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and Court Management, CACM.  They, of course, have responsibility for 
policy, and the Standing Committee has responsibility for implementation.  
I want to say thank you very much to all of my colleagues from CACM for 
helping us, and most particularly, to the former chairman of that committee, 
Judge Tunheim, who I am also pleased was able to join us today. 
Most of you are here to serve on panels.  I want to explain to you how we 
view your contribution in the overall work of the subcommittee.  We broke 
our work down into two phases.  The first I will call statistical.  Through the 
work of the Administrative Office and the Judicial Center, we have been 
able to crunch lots and lots of numbers to get an idea of what is publicly 
available, what kind of private information is showing up in court files, and, 
just from a statistical perspective, how large a problem we have and in what 
areas. 
With the benefit of that information, we are now moving to phase two, 
which is this conference.  The subcommittee decided that it would be most 
helpful to have the viewpoints of as many different persons in the legal and 
related-to-law communities about public access and private information.  
So we have invited you today, civil and criminal lawyers, prosecutors and 
defense attorneys, academics, judges, and a variety of people who serve the 
court—who serve the court as clerks of court and in various other support 
functions—to come and talk to us about your experiences in these areas.  I 
thank you so much, on behalf of the subcommittee, for giving us your time.  
And I want to remind you of what would be most helpful to us.  You are 
here to educate the committee.  Please be frank about what you have seen 
and where you identify concerns, and do not hesitate to disagree with your 
fellow panelists.  I cannot emphasize enough our view that we need to hear 
diverse views on how to calibrate the balance between public access and 
protection of privacy. 
All of this effort this morning is the work of one person, and that is the 
subcommittee reporter, Daniel Capra, Professor of Law here at Fordham.  I 
thank Dan many, many times for his work for this committee.  He also 
serves, in his spare time, as a reporter for the Evidence Committee and a 
variety of other tasks.  As everyone says, he is a dynamo, and most 
particularly in the service to the judiciary.  So thank you, Dan. 
Of course, I also want to thank Fordham University for hosting this and 
for really giving a lot of thought to what the conference should involve.  
With that by way of welcome and introduction, let me turn it over to Dan 
Capra. 
PROF. CAPRA:  Thank you, Judge.  Thank you very much for that 
excellent introduction, which sets forth basically what we are trying to do 
today. 
I am moderating a panel which we have called the general panel.  The 
subcommittee is considering at least possible changes to the privacy rules.  
The privacy rules are located in your materials, actually in a couple of 
places.  There were some pamphlets that were given out by the 
Administrative Office, and behind Joe Cecil’s report is the particular 
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privacy rules that were enacted in 2005, 5.2 of the Civil Rules, 49.1 of the 
Criminal Rules, and the like. 
The subcommittee, as I say, is considering whether rule amendments are 
necessary and also is considering a discussion of policy changes, but all 
within the context of this broader idea that Judge Raggi was talking about:  
the balance between privacy on the one hand, and open access to court 
records on the other, in the light of ease of Internet access.  So we thought it 
would be appropriate to kind of set the day with a general panel.  By 
“general,” it does not mean airy and platonic and talking about love and 
things like that.  There will be practical discussions involved as well, but 
within the context of setting a broader framework. 
I need to give my own thanks.  First of all, I need to give my thanks to 
Joe Cecil for all his fine work in terms of the statistics that he has done and 
all the searches of the records that he has done over the past month.  It has 
been truly amazing.  He will talk about that later on today, but since I have 
the opportunity, I wanted to thank him for his excellent work in that respect.  
I want to thank Susan Del Monte, who gave me many great 
recommendations about who to call and who to bring here, especially for 
the Plea Agreements Panel.  I think we have a Plea Agreements Panel that 
represents all the views that all the districts have been coming up with.  I 
would like to thank Susan for giving me those suggestions. 
Allyson Haynes, from the University of Charleston School of Law, I 
would like to thank because Charleston did a program that covered some of 
these issues, and she was very helpful in helping me to form ideas for this 
program. 
With that, I am done.  I would like to give you over to my colleague, who 
I am proud to have here on the panel, Professor Joel Reidenberg, Professor 
of Law at Fordham Law School and Director of the Center on Law and 
Information Privacy. 
PROF. REIDENBERG:  Thank you, Dan, thank you, judges.  I think it is 
terrific that you are focusing so carefully on these issues. 
My background is as a privacy scholar, not as a civil procedure expert.  
So my remarks will be focused on some of the broader privacy issues that 
open access raises. 
To set the stage, I would like to focus on a few of the problems 
associated with too much transparency.  We do not often think about 
publicly held information as giving us too much transparency in our 
society.  But to follow up on some of the comments that Judge Raggi made 
just a few minutes ago, in the past, when we thought about the openness of 
public records and particularly about court records that were open to the 
public, we would find that those records still had an effective privacy 
protection through practical obscurity.  Access to the information was not 
easy and physical or geographical limitations restricted how widely 
information in the public records could actually be disseminated or 
obtained.  This made public record information practically obscure. 
The Internet and network information flows eliminate that practical 
obscurity today.  We now live in a context with an increasingly and 
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completely transparent citizen that has, I think, some very significant 
dimensions.  I would like to focus on two points during this short 
presentation and make a suggestion for a way of approaching the tradeoff 
between openness and privacy. 
The first point is that completely open access has important public safety 
implications.  The Amy Boyer case illustrates this problem.  Amy Boyer 
lived in New Hampshire and was murdered by an ex-boyfriend who, 
through access to information obtained from an information broker, found 
out where she lived and worked, stalked her, and shot her at her workplace.7  
That same kind of data, locational data, can now easily be gleaned from 
publicly available court records, if they are online and searchable, and used 
just as Boyer’s ex-boyfriend used the same data obtained from the 
information broker.  That is one obvious problem. 
The less obvious, but very difficult, problem is the de-contextual use of 
information that would be contained in court filings and court decisions.  If 
information about individuals is extracted from court filings and exploited 
through data mining or combined with additional information acquired from 
data brokers, from other public databases or from other publicly available 
information, the original context is lost and the data mining leads to the 
development of behavior profiles of individuals, to stereotyping, and to 
decisions based on what I will call “secretive data processing” because the 
data mining and profiling is hidden from the individuals.  In effect, by 
making all this information about the citizen so transparent, the public does 
not really know what happens to their personal information and, ironically, 
the accuracy of the information describing individuals can be compromised 
through out-of-context compilations and profiling. 
Another obvious consequence of the transparency of personal 
information is identity theft.  The richness of data that is in court filings 
would be very useful for identity thieves.  A criminal can very easily 
masquerade as someone else if data can be taken from varied sources and 
combined together to provide enough personal information about the 
victim. 
The second point is that the integrity of the judicial system is challenged.  
This goes back to the comments that were made earlier in today’s session.  
Unprecedented wide access and dissemination of everyday court records 
and proceedings can have an impact on jurors’ willingness to serve and on 
witness candor.  If the personal cost for engaging with the legal system is a 
perceived loss of privacy because the data is now publicly accessible, freely 
searchable, and “Google-able” on the Web, the public hesitates or opposes 
participation in the judicial system.  Similarly, parties may be intimidated 
by the Internet accessibility of personal information related to their 
participation in a court proceeding.  There is a qualitative difference from 
the days when an observer had to go to a musty courthouse to find the data.  
People will be reluctant to come to court to vindicate their rights if they 
perceive that it makes their lives a completely open book. 
 
 7. Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1005–06 (N.H. 2003). 
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Lastly, the transparency has an impact on perceptions of judicial 
integrity.  The data mining that might go on with respect to litigants, 
witnesses, or statements made in a court filing can just as easily occur with 
respect to the judges themselves and the judges’ personal lives.  Many 
would be surprised at the associations about judges that might be made by 
data mining information in court cases just from the way judges manage 
their cases.  So these issues suggest that public safety and the integrity of 
the judicial system are at risk from over-transparency. 
As to my suggestion, I would like to focus on the approach to the trade-
off between openness and privacy.  I know that court systems have focused 
very carefully on redaction as one potential solution.  The redaction model 
is also used outside the United States, in many foreign jurisdictions, as a 
way of balancing privacy interests with court oversight.  But another model 
that I would like to recommend as a very worthwhile avenue for the courts 
to explore is limited-purposes disclosures.  This approach makes personal 
information available publicly, but only for defined purposes.  We see this 
approach in American legislation, specifically the Driver’s Privacy 
Protection Act.8  Under the Act, driver’s license information is a public 
record, but the data cannot be used for purposes other than those 
enumerated in the statute.  The permissible purposes relate to the reasons 
why the data is public information such as driver authentication, car 
insurance, recalls, that sort of thing. 
I think we need to explore this approach in the court context.  The court 
system should be addressing key questions.  Why is the information about 
these individuals publicly available?  What is the reason for the information 
to be publicly available?  What are we trying to accomplish?  Can we 
construct limits on use in ways that are compatible with the public purpose 
for the information being out there? 
I will close with that. 
PROF. CAPRA:  Thank you, Joel. 
I turn now to Ron Hedges, former Magistrate Judge for the District of 
New Jersey.  He worked very hard to get the Sedona Conference to come 
up with principles on privacy and public access to courts in a civil context.  
I will also put in a plug that he is an excellent Special Master in the matter 
of In re REFCO.9 
MR. HEDGES:  As are you. 
PROF. CAPRA:  I do not know about excellent, but I am as well.  Over 
to Ron. 
MR. HEDGES:  Good morning.  Thank you for allowing me to be here.  
I want to spend a few minutes talking with you about how The Sedona 
 
 8. 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2006). 
 9. In re REFCO Sec. Litig., No. 07 MDL 1902(JSR), 2010 WL 304966 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
21, 2010). 
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Conference10 [Sedona] came up with its Best Practices on Public Access 
and Confidentiality in Civil Litigation. 
Sedona works through “Working Groups.”  The Best Practices were a 
product of Working Group 2 [WG2], and I was a member of the editorial 
team.  I think I can tell you, not surprisingly—I expect you are going to 
hear it today—this was a very contentious process.  There were a number of 
interests involved. 
There were a lot of people on WG2 who were very pro-access.  There 
were others representing corporate interests that were concerned about 
protecting secrets, and the like, that took an opposite view.  It took four 
years to get the Best Practices to the public version that is now available.  
As I said, the process was contentious throughout. 
What we did was to come up with a draft, and we did a series of “town 
halls” around the country, five or six, inviting different constituencies to 
come in and comment.  It is fair to say that we have a couple of themes that 
go through everything. 
The first theme was a very basic distinction between discovery materials 
that generally do not see the light of day and that people can protect as 
much as they want under Rule 26(c)11 or the like and materials that are filed 
in court.  We were very much opposed to the concept of confidentiality 
orders that included an automatic sealing provision such that, if parties 
exchange discovery materials, they can simply—by filing an affidavit or 
whatever—seal materials filed with the court.  That is a First Amendment 
violation. 
I realize that there has always been a concern that we are driving people 
out of the system because of transparency issues.  We can debate that all 
day, if we need to do that.  But it is fair to say that Sedona came down very 
much on the idea of open judicial proceedings, including jury selection, 
openness in settlements, and openness in anything that may be filed with 
the court.  So we have the basic distinction between what goes on between 
parties and what goes into courts. 
We also came out very strongly on the concept of intervention.  If there 
are sealing orders filed, the public or the public is representative, which is 
often the press, should have an opportunity to come in and challenge these 
before a judge. 
I am happy to say that we have been percolating along for three years 
now.  We are about to go online with another version of a database that 
accumulates case law that has developed in the last several years, of which 
there is an enormous amount.  I see a trend of the future that we will see a 
lot more issues created by electronic filings.  For example, inadvertently 
produced materials may be on the Internet that should not have been there 
and how those materials are brought back. 
 
 10. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, http://www.thesedonaconference.org/ (last visited Sept. 
23, 2010). 
 11. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
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In a nutshell, that is how The Sedona Conference put together the Best 
Practices, what the Best Practices are intended to accomplish, and where the 
Best Practices and WG2 may be in the course of the next several years. 
PROF. CAPRA:  Thank you, Ron. 
Peter Winn has been writing articles in this area for a number of years 
now.  He provided comments on the initial redaction rules that came 
through.  He has written an article dealing with some of the issues that the 
subcommittee is investigating today.  Peter Winn is an attorney for the 
Department of Justice and Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of 
Washington Law School.  Let me turn it over to Peter. 
MR. WINN:  Thank you very much. 
I got into this business by accident several years ago when one of the 
local judges in Seattle asked me to write an article about the privacy 
implications of putting judicial records online.12  Over the next few years, I 
became less and less happy with the analysis in that article and wrote 
another that came out last year in the Federal Courts Law Review.13  I am 
already starting to reconsider some of the arguments in that article. 
I keep changing my mind because two things are going on here that are 
very difficult to reconcile:  we want court records and proceedings to be 
open and transparent, but we also want to make sure that sensitive 
information in the hands of the courts is protected.  Both goals are 
important.  Transparency is necessary for the legitimacy of the system, 
necessary to maintain a healthy political feedback loop, and necessary for 
effective public oversight.  However, at the same time, courts also have a 
fundamental responsibility to engage in a truth-finding process.  To find the 
truth, courts need access to sensitive information from the participants in 
the process—not only the litigants, but jurors and witnesses as well—
people who are critical for the fact-finding process to work.  Traditionally, 
these judicial participants have been more or less comfortable disclosing 
their sensitive information with the understanding it would be used only for 
purposes of resolving the dispute in the context of the judicial process and 
would not come back to bite them.  When participants start getting burned 
or hurt after disclosing their sensitive information to the court—when the 
information is used for other purposes than resolving the dispute—litigants, 
witnesses, and jurors are going to be less and less inclined to tell the truth in 
the first place.  Thus, to make the system work we need both transparency 
and privacy. 
In the good old days of the paper-based system, we could have our cake 
and eat it too.  We could have both transparency and privacy because of the 
practical obscurity of paper.  Paper records were public, or at least ninety-
nine percent of them were public—the ones that were not filed under seal.  
But because paper records were difficult to access, very few people were 
 
 12. Peter A. Winn, Online Court Records:  Balancing Judicial Accountability and 
Privacy in an Age of Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307 (2004). 
 13. Peter A. Winn, Judicial Information Management in an Electronic Age:  Old 
Standards, New Challenges, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 135 (2009). 
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ever hurt when sensitive information was filed in the so-called “public” 
judicial system. 
By contrast, electronic information is not practically obscure—its very 
essence is to be easy to access.  In this new world of electronic information, 
we have become increasingly aware, sometimes shockingly aware, of just 
how complicated and difficult it is to have both a transparent system and a 
system that protects sensitive information.  It was probably just as difficult 
when people started to use paper in the thirteenth century, but we had 800 
years to get used to it. 
So where are we in the federal system?  I like to think of the federal 
system as a guinea pig, because it was out there first.  That was probably 
because we did not know any better—the benefits seemed obvious, the 
costs hidden by the habits of centuries of using practically obscure paper.  
The state courts have been the next wave and are struggling with the same 
problems.  I have learned much from watching the transition in the federal 
system, but, in many ways, the state courts have much greater challenges.  
Juvenile cases, divorce cases, probate cases, all present much more difficult 
problems than those typically faced in the federal system. 
In the federal system, to some extent, we have only jumped halfway into 
the swimming pool.  PACER is still not Google-searchable.  It still has a lot 
of the attributes of practical obscurity, simply because of the difficulty of 
accessing the electronic information.  I think it is almost certain that it is 
going to be Google-searchable in ten years or sooner.  It may be Google-
searchable much sooner than that.  The law.gov movement, largely under 
the leadership of Carl Malamud, is already in the process of seeing to it that 
federal court records are online in a Google-searchable manner.14  It is just 
in the nature of electronic information that it will become much more 
accessible and will raise more and more difficult problems in the context of 
protecting sensitive information. 
So how do we protect sensitive information in courts?  There are three 
basic strategies. 
One is not to put the information into the system in the first place.  
Categories like Social Security numbers, names of minor children, financial 
account numbers—a lot of times you simply do not need that information in 
a pleading to start with— 
JUDGE MORRIS:  Excuse me, let me just interrupt.  The word is called 
bankruptcy. 
MR. WINN:  Right, bankruptcy. 
JUDGE MORRIS:  I will get there in a minute. 
MR. WINN:  I stand corrected.  You do need to put quite a lot of 
sensitive information in a bankruptcy file as a matter of law.  So that 
strategy does not work very well in bankruptcy.  And more generally, that 
 
 14. LAW.GOV:  A PROPOSED DISTRIBUTED REPOSITORY OF ALL PRIMARY LEGAL 
MATERIALS OF THE UNITED STATES, http://public.resource.org/law.gov (last visited Sept. 23, 
2010). 
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strategy will not work when sensitive information needs to be filed with the 
court. 
A second strategy is to try to put it in the judicial system either under 
seal, or offline.  The 2007 privacy rules permit the use of protective orders 
to take documents or information offline—similar to how Social Security 
and immigration cases are routinely handled today.  This strategy has not 
yet widely been adopted by lawyers.  Instead, agreed sealing orders are still 
the norm.  However, while reliable to protect sensitive information, agreed 
sealing orders often fail to meet the required common law and 
constitutional standard—a standard seldom enforced in the absence of a 
dispute.  As electronic court records become increasingly subject to 
computerized audits, and as the improper use by attorneys of the agreed 
sealing order to protect sensitive information becomes subject to greater 
legal scrutiny, the agreed sealing order, itself, may become a thing of the 
past.  If that happens, using protective orders to take sensitive information 
offline may become the only practical alternative. 
The third idea to protect sensitive information was just raised by 
Professor Joel Reidenberg.  That is, to prevent people from using sensitive 
information filed in court records for secondary uses unrelated to the 
administration of justice.  A general rule permitting disclosure of certain 
information in the context of the public court proceeding but prohibiting 
disclosure of the same information outside the courthouse would probably 
be unconstitutional.  In my article in the Federal Courts Law Review,15 
however, I suggested that a more limited set of information management 
requirements, unrelated to any specific content, and imposed solely on bulk 
data aggregators might pass constitutional muster.  Data aggregators might 
be required by contract to adhere to certain information management 
procedures in exchange for the grant of bulk access privileges.  Thus, for 
instance, they might be required to “scrub” their data for inadvertently filed 
Social Security numbers (as many of them do now anyway).  However, 
with the exception of limited computer “scrubbing” techniques, I have 
grave doubts that general rules to address the more difficult problem of 
secondary use of information from court files—for instance, “data mining” 
judicial information for commercial purposes—will ever be likely either to 
pass constitutional muster or be very effective as a practical matter at 
protecting sensitive information.  In conclusion, I do not see any obvious, 
easy, one-size-fits-all solution.   
I do have some hope that we will be able to muddle through and find 
solutions to these problems, but I do not think it will be easy, or that the 
solutions will be found quickly.  We have three basic tools available:  rules, 
training, and technology.  I think the rules that the federal courts have 
developed are reasonably good.  I am just not sure that there is much more 
you can do in the rulemaking process.  You cannot have a general rule 
forbidding the filing of all sensitive information—much of that information 
must be part of the public court record, and what is sensitive in some 
 
 15. See Winn, supra note 13. 
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contexts is not sensitive in others.  The courts have to rely on the parties 
and their attorneys to identify the sensitive information in their filings and 
take affirmative steps to protect it.  That is pretty much all the rules do now, 
and pretty much what any rules in the future would ever be able to do. 
The more significant area of deficiency—that is, the area where there is 
most room for improvement—is the need for better training of lawyers.  
Most of us have developed our intuitions in a paper-based world of 
practical obscurity.  We have taken it for granted that documents filed with 
the clerk’s office will stay in the court system and will not surprise us with 
unexpected secondary uses.  Many older lawyers still have their secretaries 
file their pleadings on the PACER system, and lack any real personal 
knowledge of the system.  The younger generation is much more 
technologically literate, but we can all do with better training.  It may not be 
until our children’s generation is practicing law that lawyers will become 
better attuned to the problems of handling judicial information properly, 
given the wider and more open set of possibilities for its secondary use.  
We, who have been trained in a particular way, will simply have to die and 
let somebody else take over. 
The area with potentially the most promise is the improvement offered by 
better technology.  We can do a much better job facilitating access.  Court 
decisions, briefs ought to be Google-searchable.  We can do a much better 
job than we are doing protecting sensitive information in the process, and 
technology is an important part of that solution.  Professor Edward Felten 
has highlighted many of these potential solutions.  These technological 
solutions are possible only if lawyers and judges begin to work proactively 
with computer programmers.  We tend to assume that computer technology 
is a given when we engage in rulemaking or when we plan our CLE 
programs.  It is not.  The problems that we fashion rules to try to address, 
and that we train lawyers to better understand, are in part, creatures of a 
particular form of technology.  The design of that technology can be 
changed to solve some of these problems.  However, these technological 
changes often spawn new problems, making new rules and training 
necessary.  It is an endless cycle, but that is no reason to give up. 
As we struggle with these problems in the federal system, much can be 
learned from watching our sister courts in the state system navigate these 
electronic rapids.  State courts have much larger dockets, and often manage 
much more sensitive information than do the federal courts—one need only 
think of the type of information handled by family courts and in juvenile 
criminal proceedings to see just how difficult these challenges are.  One 
lesson that appears to have been learned by both the state and the federal 
courts is the importance of involving as diverse as possible group of 
interested parties in the development of both the rules and the technology 
which will be used as courts go online.  At the Williamsburg conferences 
where state and federal court personnel meet to explore different ideas,16 
 
 16. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.ncsconline.org/
images/NCSC_GeneralBrocWEB.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2010). 
12 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
there appears to be a consensus that it is critical to get everybody to the 
table when you are making decisions.  The process is similar to that 
involved in drafting an environmental-impact-statement.  When all the 
affected players are at the table, the conversation can be contentious.  
However, it makes it more likely you will identify the problems at the front 
end, when it is still possible to hash out some solutions.  Furthermore, it 
makes it more likely that the proposed solutions you reach will be more 
likely to work, with greater buy-in by participants in the end.  It is nearly 
impossible to identify the problems of managing sensitive information 
when you try to think these things through in the abstract.  You have to get 
everybody at the table and explore the problems before you can identify 
solutions. 
Finally, a related point I would like to make is that sensitive information 
is largely a matter of context.  Information is not sensitive simply because it 
jumps out at us that it needs protection.  It all depends.  Information can be 
sensitive in some contexts and not in others.  For instance, information 
excluded by the application of the Rules of Evidence is not sensitive if 
disclosed to the public; but it is very sensitive if disclosed to the jury.  Thus, 
a motion to suppress can be filed and disclosed to the public subject to the 
classic judicial oversight concepts.  However, if a juror uses the PACER 
system to learn about the cocaine seized by an illegal government search or 
a defendant’s prior criminal record—information which may be public and 
online—we may no longer be able to provide the defendant a fair trial, 
consistent with fundamental notions of due process. 
In the eighteenth century, Jeremy Bentham argued against the 
exclusionary rules of evidence, arguing that jurors should be trusted to 
make decisions after hearing all the facts.17  As electronic information 
becomes more and more difficult to control, we may be forced to adopt 
Bentham’s view of the exclusionary rules.  However, I believe and hope 
that we all can focus on this problem and get a handle on it.  I think we have 
to get a handle on it.  But I really do not have any obvious, easy solutions 
about how to do it, other than to try to muddle through, and continue to 
work together. 
Thank you. 
PROF. CAPRA:  Thanks, Peter. 
Our next speaker is Lucy Dalglish, Executive Director of the Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press. 
MS. DALGLISH:  Thank you.  Good morning.  It is nice to be here. 
The Reporters Committee, for those of you who do not know, is a legal 
defense and advocacy organization based in Washington, D.C.18  We have 
been around for forty years.  We help journalists defend themselves when 
they are in trouble and gain access to all sorts of state and federal records 
and proceedings.  I have one entire program area, run by a super-fellow, an 
 
 17. See JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 15–16 (1827). 
 18. THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2010). 
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experienced litigator who has spent a year with us, and they are focused 
solely in the area of secret courts and prior restraints.  This is of great 
interest to me.  I am a former journalist and a former litigator.  All of my 
lawyers are former reporters. 
I need you to understand a little bit about the landscape that journalism is 
operating in right now.  Whereas all of the rest of you are probably going, 
“Oh, my God, the Internet.  Everything’s available,” reporters are going, 
“Oh, my God, the Internet.  Everything’s available.  Suddenly I might 
actually be able to do my job effectively.” 
We are in a situation where there are a lot fewer journalists in 
mainstream news organizations.  By having easy access to this information, 
they are able to do a better job of reporting the news to the public.  There 
are some jurisdictions—probably not Manhattan, but certainly in places like 
Utah—where you have many local newspapers and really only one federal 
court that covers an enormous geographic area.  Now they are able to 
accurately and completely report news stories as well.  We view the 
PACER system as miraculous.  It by and large works very, very well.  I 
work on cases all across the country, and I love it, because I no longer have 
to rely on a local lawyer to go and dig out some information about a case I 
have heard about. 
There are, as I said, fewer reporters.  Many of them who were able to 
support a family on a journalism income in the past are no longer able to do 
that, so you have a lot more independent journalists.  Money is an obstacle 
to PACER.  A lot of them just cannot even afford to use it anymore. 
I want to break my comments, very briefly, down into several categories.  
One, I would like to talk about the identifiers issue.  I would like to talk 
briefly about plea agreements.  I would like to talk very briefly about 
settlement agreements, the trend toward anonymous juries, and then the 
most important problem of all, which really was not even on the agenda, the 
issue of disappearing cases in the federal docket system. 
First of all, identifier issues.  I was one of the folks who testified back in 
2002 or when you came up with the first rules.  By and large, I think the 
redaction system that you have implemented that allows the last four digits 
of bank account numbers and Social Security numbers works fairly well.  It 
does not cause a lot of phone calls from reporters.  They are not all that 
concerned about it. 
One thing that is a problem, however, is the birth date issue.  Reporters’ 
issues have to do almost exclusively with making sure they have the right 
person.  I come from the land of Johnsons, Andersons, Sorensons, and 
Carlsons.  And there are not just hundreds of them; there are thousands of 
them.  You need to make sure that you have the right John Anderson.  
Reporters do not want to identify the wrong John Anderson as a criminal.  
They want to be accurate.  Often the best way to ensure you have the right 
John Anderson is to know the birth date of the person who has been 
charged with a crime.  Perhaps even worse than having personal identifying 
information released about someone actually involved in a court case is 
when information is released and everybody thinks it is about the wrong 
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guy.  That is a real problem, and the more information you can provide, 
particularly a birth date, helps reporters identify the right person. 
If you do not need all the rest of this stuff—I understand bankruptcy is an 
exception—if you do not need it, why are you collecting it?  I think you 
really need to think very carefully about the identifying information that 
you do collect in the federal court files. 
Plea agreements are something that reporters traditionally have relied 
upon—not every day, but sometimes there is very useful information that 
appears in those cases.  It is helpful to flesh out a story, to identify trends.  
Lately, with the reporters who are calling me and asking me, “Why can’t I 
get this plea agreement information?” it has to do with business cases, 
where they are trying to figure out who in Enron or who in whatever other 
criminal economic case they have is talking to whom.  That information is 
very useful. 
One of the problems that I hear is from reporters who work for the 
national publications and national broadcast stations.  You guys have rules 
that are different all over the country.  I have one summer intern coming in 
this summer who is going to work on just keeping track of what the feds are 
doing with plea agreements, because we need to be able to tell reporters 
what they can get and what they cannot get in each district. 
There is, in my mind, an appalling trend toward completely anonymous 
juries in the federal system and the state system as well.  I understand that 
we are asking people to give up a lot when they become a juror.  But you 
know what?  That is something that, when you are an American citizen, you 
just sign up for.  We have a responsibility to serve on juries.  I think the 
notion that you cannot find out who jurors are in the federal system, unless 
you are really, really lucky or you file requests for it months and months 
after a case is resolved or you are lucky enough to sit through a trial, to find 
out who is sitting on that jury panel—I think it is appalling.  I think a 
criminal defendant is entitled to a fair trial, and part of that is having the 
ability for the public to know whether or not the people who were 
empanelled on that jury should have been empanelled on that jury. 
The best case I can think of about this—and it was not a federal case, but 
I think it illustrates my point—there was a murder case being tried in New 
Jersey.  It resulted in a mistrial.  The Philadelphia Inquirer did a story about 
what was going on in this entire case. 19  They were the ones that figured 
out that the jury foreman did not even live in New Jersey.  She was from 
Pennsylvania.  She had apparently had a car licensed in New Jersey.  She 
got elected to be the jury foreman in this murder trial.  That is just 
appalling.  And it was a reporter who figured that out. 
When you came up with the electronic court access rules, this completely 
slipped right by us.  It was not until probably six months afterwards that 
reporters were calling saying, “What is going on?  All of a sudden we 
 
 19. Rita Giordano, Post-Neulander Trial Contempt Case Near End, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
May 24, 2002, at B3. 
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cannot find out who is sitting on a federal jury unless we are actually sitting 
there and we might overhear a name.” 
It turned out that this was part of the electronic access rules that 
completely slipped by us.  You would have heard from us if I had been 
paying better attention way back when. 
Settlement agreements—I think Ron is going to talk more about all of 
this.  There is some very important information that can be accessed.  It is 
of great public benefit.  Probably the best example—and perhaps Dave 
McCraw can talk about this a little bit more from The New York Times 
Company standpoint—The Boston Globe—again, I think these were mostly 
state court cases—found out a great deal of information from their Pulitzer 
Prize-winning stories on priest abuse in the Archdiocese of Boston.20  Most 
of that information came after they were able to go back twenty, thirty, 
forty years and get a lot of those settlement agreements unsealed.  I think 
when the safety of children is involved, there is no reason whatsoever why 
all of these things need to be sealed.  It is a public safety issue. 
Finally, the secret docket cases.  I never in a million years would have 
thought this would be possible.  We have a system of open courts in this 
country.  I understand that in certain circumstances when you are 
conducting a criminal investigation and you have not completed all of the 
indictments in your case that you are trying to present and you are trying to 
get all your ducks in a row and get people charged in the right order, maybe 
it has to be temporarily sealed.  But right now, as far as I can tell, there is 
not a single district in this country who has figured out how to reopen those 
completely secret cases once they have been closed. 
What usually happens is a U.S. Attorney will come in and say, “We just 
caught this really bad guy,” and you will go in and try to find the case—this 
is not in every district, but in a fair number of them—and it does not exist.  
You go to the clerk of court and they say, “We cannot open it unless we 
have a court order.”  You go to the judge and he says, “I cannot unseal it 
unless the U.S. Attorney tells me I can.”  And you go to the U.S. Attorney 
and they say, “Well, that is a problem that the judge is supposed to come up 
with.” 
Meanwhile, at one point several years ago, we found thousands of cases 
in the federal system where docket numbers were just missing.  Now, I 
know the Judicial Conference has attempted to address this issue, but it has 
not been fixed yet. 
My very last point is on the civil side.  There was a case we got involved 
in about a year ago, involving a federal civil case that was conducted 
entirely in secret in Pennsylvania for seven years.  It was a situation where a 
woman brought a claim under the federal anti-pregnancy discrimination 
law.21  She sued her former employer, who, she contended, fired her 
 
 20. Predator Priests, BOSTON GLOBE, http://www.boston.com/globe/
spotlight/abuse/predators/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2010). 
 21. Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 371 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming 
the district court’s order to seal the case). 
16 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
because she had an abortion.  This thing was litigated for seven years.  The 
only way we found out about it was when it was appealed to the Third 
Circuit and the Third Circuit decision was released and the local legal 
newspaper said, “What is this?”  They went back to get the documents, and 
the entire case was sealed. 
That is just plain not right. 
PROF. CAPRA:  Thanks, Lucy. 
I will say there are people in this room who are on the case of some of 
the issues that Lucy was dealing with, particularly disappearing docket 
numbers, entirely sealed cases.  That report, to my understanding, is 
forthcoming. 
So there has been significant work done on that.  The Privacy 
Subcommittee and the Sealing Subcommittee have been kind of working in 
tandem on these issues, because the issues do tend to overlap in some 
respects. 
But thanks for bringing that up.  That is an issue that the Judicial 
Conference is working on. 
You have already heard the fact that some of these issues are much more 
difficult in bankruptcy than anywhere else.  We will see when Joe Cecil 
presents his data that many of the unredacted Social Security numbers that 
have been found in the two-month search that Joe did were in bankruptcy 
proceedings.  So we thought it appropriate in terms of setting the table for 
the rest of the day to bring in an expert on these matters.  That is Judge 
Cecelia Morris, who is from the Southern District of New York Bankruptcy 
Court and also served as the clerk of that court for many years. 
I turn the floor over to Judge Morris. 
JUDGE MORRIS:  Okay, everybody, get a pen and paper out right now 
and number from one to five.  I am serious.  Do it.  I was given this idea by 
Karen Gross, the president of Southern Vermont College since 2006. 
I want you to write down five entities that you owe money to.  Do it.  
This is a serious test.  Besides writing down who you owe money to, write 
down how much you owe them.  And do not tell me you do not have any 
debt.  If you have a phone in your pocket, you have debt, because they give 
it to you on credit.  They give you electricity on credit.  So you have debt. 
While you are doing this, I want your full name, every name you have 
been known under, and your Social Security number.  Your monthly 
mortgage payments, your cable bill, your insurance premiums.  Keep 
writing.  I see people not writing. 
I want the ages of your minor children.  Are you getting there? 
Now, beginning right here, I want you to come up to this podium and 
read everything you have just written to this room. 
That is how it feels to file bankruptcy. 
Privacy is important.  Last year the consumer cases skyrocketed, and 1.3 
million entities filed bankruptcy, most of those filings were individuals that 
had to do exactly what you did.  And, by the way, we are putting it on the 
Internet. 
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MS. DALGLISH:  Full Social Security numbers are going on the 
Internet? 
JUDGE MORRIS:  No, full Social Security numbers are no longer going 
on the Internet.  But that is what you are doing, and we are sending your 
full Social Security numbers to your creditors.  They are not going on the 
Internet. 
By the way, we are also putting this information on PACER at an 
incredibly low price.  The idea that you cannot afford to go on PACER at 
how much a page?  That is sort of beyond me. 
There is a difference here also between the number of cases filed in 
federal district court of about 300,000 and the 1.3 million cases filed in 
bankruptcy courts.  Bankruptcy, as we have already heard, more than any 
other area of law, has a pronounced dichotomy between the debtor’s 
privacy rights and the rights of creditors and the public to this information. 
Section 107 of the Bankruptcy Code states that information filed in the 
bankruptcy court is “public records and open to examination by an entity at 
reasonable times without charge.”22  That is what it says. 
The press may want the birth date.  My financial world wants my Social 
Security number.  In 1995, when CM/ECF23 went live, I did not even know 
my Social Security number.  Why did I not know it?  I did not have to have 
it for every credit card, for every financial transaction.  Today it is 
memorized.  Why?  Because it is part of every financial transaction. 
So I am filing bankruptcy.  What do I need?  I need my name, address, 
birth date, familial situation.  Am I married?  How many kids do I have?  
What are their ages?  Employer, current income, assets, including real 
property, jewelry, household goods, liabilities, current rent, mortgage 
payment, taxes, club fees, medical expenses, tuition payments, charitable 
donations, creditors, judgment, liens, leases, security deposits, IRAs, and all 
other retirement accounts.  Each of those entities that I owe money to needs 
correct information in order to prosecute their claim.  Your credit life is 
now tracked through your Social Security number. 
The bankruptcy electronic filing system is vital to the practitioners, the 
creditors, the judges that participate in the bankruptcy system.  It also 
greatly expands the number of individuals who can easily access the 
information.  The debtor and the creditors and the public all benefit from 
the thorough disclosure of information.  My name is Cecelia Morris.  I do 
not want to be confused with the Cecelia Morris that filed bankruptcy in 
Brooklyn.  It is similar in this way to the no-fly list that unless you have 
another identifier to distinguish Cecelia Morris in Poughkeepsie and 
Cecelia Morris in Brooklyn, it would mess up my credit report. 
In response to privacy concerns, we have all heard about the December 
2003 rules that allow only the disclosure of the last four digits of a Social 
Security number on the publicly available bankruptcy petition.  You still 
 
 22. 11 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 23. CM/ECF (Case Management/Electronic Case Files) is the case management and 
electronic case files system for most United States federal courts. 
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have to file the Social Security number, because your creditors are entitled 
to the full Social Security number.  It is only the public information and the 
public docket that redacts everything except the last four digits.  Again, you 
want to make sure the right parties and interests have the right notice, the 
proper notice, and are necessarily at the meeting of creditors. 
When I described to you about coming up here and talking, that is the 
meeting of creditors.  The meeting of creditors is run by a trustee.  “Raise 
your right hand.  Do you solemnly swear that everything you have told me 
on this petition is true and correct?  Does anyone have a question?” 
Under this new system, most of the account numbers are redacted, 
including bank accounts, credit cards, loans.  When a case is filed pro se, 
the court makes every effort to protect private information since pro se 
debtors will often fail to redact confidential information.  There is good 
quality control in the bankruptcy court clerk’s office.  There is really very 
good quality control on the petition filed by attorneys.  The lawyers know 
how to do it.  It gets done.  The pro ses hand it in physically—remember, 
the electronic case filing system in the bankruptcy court is made for 
lawyers.  It is not made for pro ses.  Pro ses still have to come to the court. 
The last thing that happened to me in the courtroom that was just blatant 
was when a lawyer had filed a petition with the wrong Social Security 
number and, in filing with the wrong Social Security number, she then filed 
a motion that said that was the wrong Social Security number and this is the 
correct one.  The motion had the full Social Security number.  Needless to 
say, she was chastised in court.  She also fired a staffer.  I am sure that was 
not the only thing the staffer had done, but that incident underscores the 
importance of maintaining a high level of discipline when it comes to 
redacting information. 
Now let’s talk about creditors. 
Everybody is familiar with the Bernie Madoff case.  Does anyone in the 
room not know about Bernie Madoff and the Ponzi scheme?  Guess what 
happened?  All of the proofs of claims have attachments.  What did they do 
with the attachments, these creditors?  They scanned those—Social Security 
numbers, home addresses, investment account numbers.  Some of these 
people are worth a lot of money.  With their Social Security numbers, you 
can go down to the bankruptcy court or sit at home on your computer, and 
you can find out a lot of information. 
If I had to identify the greatest source of unredacted information, I would 
point to proofs of claims filed by pro se creditors.  Not all creditors are 
large banks with legal counsel; many creditors are small businesses or 
individuals who will attempt to fill out a proof of claim themselves.  As in 
the Madoff case, they will attach all sorts of identifying information about 
both the debtor and themselves.  Compounding this problem is that these 
proofs of claim, unlike the bankruptcy petition itself, is not quality 
controlled by the bankruptcy clerk’s office. 
With respect to pro se debtors and pro se creditors, it is clear that they do 
not know why it is so important to redact identifying information.  The 
court and the official forms may be able to do a better job at clarifying why 
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things need to be redacted, to prevent identity theft, and how to redact 
information, block it out.  Clear, unequivocal instructions such as, “Do not 
give us your full Social Security Number in this proof of claim.” 
PROF. CAPRA:  Thank you, Judge. 
As Judge Raggi pointed out in her introduction, a historical kind of 
framework for this is going to be very valuable for the committee.  We 
could not get anybody better on that particular task than Professor Maeva 
Marcus.  I would like to turn it over to her.  She is a Research Professor of 
Law and Director of the Institute for Constitutional History at George 
Washington University Law School. 
PROF. MARCUS:  Thank you. 
After reading the summaries of what will be discussed today, and after 
hearing my fellow panelists, I realize that historians’ concerns are 
somewhat different from the problems on the conference agenda.  We take 
the long view:  we want court papers to be saved exactly as they were filed 
and to be accessible in the future, because they are a fruitful source for all 
kinds of historical research.  Since the beginning of the national 
government in 1789, the operations of the federal judiciary have played a 
significant role in the development of the nation, and no one today can 
anticipate what particular topic will be of interest to scholars in the coming 
decades.  It is impossible to determine what will be relevant and important 
to the questions that will be studied fifty or a hundred years from now.  
Historians, therefore, do not want records to be changed in any way or 
destroyed. 
They also do not want records to be sealed.  I do not have firsthand 
experience with case papers that have been sealed.  I do know, however, 
that papers are sealed too frequently, and litigation has ensued.  If these 
papers are not eventually opened, who knows what will have been lost to 
history.  Historians would urge the privacy subcommittee to devote the time 
and energy to finding technological solutions to practical problems like the 
redacting of information that would identify individuals or making voir dire 
transcripts public, so that scholars can have access to as many court papers 
as possible in the future.  I understand that there are instances in which 
sealing the record, or part of it, is the only feasible solution at the moment.  
I would encourage the subcommittee to consider time limits for sealed 
papers. 
Time limits have been used in a variety of situations where privacy is a 
concern.  Judges who leave their papers to public repositories, for example, 
often provide in the deeds of gift that the collections cannot be used for a 
specified length of time.  We assume, especially when the time limit is 
stated as “after all judges who served with the subject have left the bench,” 
that the concern is to spare embarrassment for the judge’s colleagues.  But 
often a judge’s papers contain items such as information about litigants that 
raise privacy concerns.  Historians sometimes find copies of court filings in 
these collections, and these papers do not necessarily have the redactions 
that you find in the official copies of the documents.  And this is a good 
thing for us.  The very items of information that are redacted are often 
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useful to scholarly studies.  While the judge and parties might not want this 
information disseminated at the time the case is being considered by the 
court, we would like it to be preserved.  Historians believe that primary 
sources should be kept just as they originated.  No changes should be made 
by another hand.  If a time limit is imposed on sealed court records or 
redactions, I think that privacy concerns would dissipate. 
As illustration of historians’ need for unadulterated court papers, I can 
point to a number of very important books whose authors have used federal 
court records as their primary sources.  Most of these concern courts in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau produced 
the only monograph dealing with a federal district court in the 1790s, an in-
depth study of the court in Kentucky that served by law as both district and 
circuit court.24  My own work on The Documentary History of the Supreme 
Court of the United States25 required many visits to regional archives to 
find the lower federal court records that would reveal how and why the case 
was brought to the Supreme Court. 
For the nineteenth century, Christian Fritz’s book, Federal Justice in 
California:  The Court of Ogden Hoffman, 1851–1891, is a perfect 
example.26  This monograph illustrates a new trend in judicial history.  
Formerly, and still today to a large extent, our conclusions about the role of 
courts and judges in our society were based on appellate opinions.  But a 
thorough study of a particular district court provides a view of the operation 
of law that had not been available to us previously.  We learn about all 
kinds of judicial business that did not eventuate in appellate court decisions.  
The great variety of litigation, the people involved in it—and the trial court 
involves the largest number of people in the federal system—all inform the 
legal, economic, and social history of the period being studied.  For an 
accurate picture to be drawn, records cannot be tampered with.  Nothing has 
been removed from the eighteenth and nineteenth century records used in 
these works.  If information is removed from twenty-first century court 
records, historians will not be able to produce equally valid studies. 
Some authors who have tackled twentieth century topics that required 
research in federal court records have found the court records useful but had 
to supply information that had been redacted from them.  Often, this 
information was found in copies of these court documents in private 
collections.  Examples include Allen Weinstein’s book, Perjury:  The Hiss-
Chambers Case27 and Stanley Kutler’s work, The American Inquisition:  
Justice and Injustice in the Cold War.28 
 
 24. MARY K. BONSTEEL TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC:  KENTUCKY 
1789–1816 (1978). 
 25. THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–
1800 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 8 vols., 1985–2007). 
 26. CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, FEDERAL JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA:  THE COURT OF OGDEN 
HOFFMAN, 1851–1891 (1991). 
 27. ALLEN WEINSTEIN, PERJURY:  THE HISS-CHAMBERS CASE (1978). 
 28. STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION:  JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN THE 
COLD WAR (1982). 
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Writing history has changed a little bit in the twenty-first century.  For 
example, a book on Bush v. Gore29 came out sooner than it would have in 
the twentieth century, because all the Florida court records were on the 
Internet, and the author was able to do research in those records quickly. 
I have addressed myself to the privacy concerns with which this 
conference is concerned.  Let me just say in conclusion that there is a larger 
question in the minds of historians, and that is the condition of the 
permanent records and where they will be found in the future.  Everyone 
seems to be talking about instant access online.  Will the courts continue to 
administer the electronic database or will electronic records be turned over 
to the National Archives, as the law requires? 
The records of federal executive agencies—and lower federal courts are 
treated as agencies by the statute—are to be turned over to the National 
Archives, and it is the National Archives’ responsibility to decide which 
records should be kept permanently.  When space for paper records was an 
issue, there were fights over the destruction of records by the National 
Archives, and court records often were involved. 
About thirty years ago, for example, the National Archives decided to 
keep all bankruptcy records from the nineteenth century but to destroy a 
large portion of the twentieth century records because there were too many 
of them.  In the early 1980s, Chief Judge of the Northern District of 
California Robert Peckham and a group of historians began a campaign to 
encourage the National Archives to rescind its decision.  They were 
partially successful.  The Archives agreed with the historians on a sampling 
plan that would preserve a sufficient number of twentieth century 
bankruptcy records to enable economic, social, and historical analyses to 
proceed.  But I gather that this sampling may not yet be in place. 
A similar problem has befallen the records of other federal courts.  The 
National Archives put on hold its most recent records schedule, because of 
opposition to the plan to destroy a large number of court records.  The 
Archives agreed to do an assessment, but that has not been completed. 
Historians face many obstacles to using court records in their research.  
Even before the advent of electronic records, courts were derelict in sending 
their papers to the Archives.  We expect to find court records in regional 
archives, but often they just are not there.  Working in the 1980s, David 
Frederick, who wrote a history of the Ninth Circuit from 1891 to 1941,30 
found no records in the Archives but, after searching the courthouse, found 
some relevant material in the clerk’s office.  When I was working on my 
Steel Seizure book31 in the 1970s, I, too, looked for records at the Archives 
but ended up finding them at the D.C. courthouse where the steel 
companies filed suit.  When you are lucky enough to find that a court 
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actually has sent its records to the regional archives, you are faced with a 
warehouse of records and no good way to search for exactly what you 
would like to see.  Electronic records represent an advance, because they, at 
least, are searchable.  Are they permanent, however?  And historians have 
found that the National Archives’ own database is difficult to use and 
behind the times, so sending records there may not be the best thing for 
historians, though the law has not changed. 
PROF. CAPRA:  Thank you. 
First, I want to ask Ron Hedges about the sealing issues.  Just being 
involved anecdotally in cases, I see that it is kind of automatic that lawyers 
file things under seal.  Is there something that needs to be done about this? 
MR. HEDGES:  I do not think it is automatic that lawyers file things 
under seal.  I think it is automatic that lawyers sign protective orders that 
have provisions in them that really govern discovery, and some place in that 
protective order there is a sealing provision. 
PROF. CAPRA:  But in REFCO,32 we had filings just filed under seal 
automatically, when they did not have any confidential information in them 
that we could see.  Does that happen routinely, in people’s experience? 
MR. HEDGES:  I think, depending on the nature of the litigation, yes.  I 
supervised a lot of IP litigation, and it is common in patent litigation and the 
like to want to protect information because someone thinks there is a 
commercial secret somewhere that cannot see the light of day.  The fact of 
the matter is, there are not many things in civil litigation that need to be 
filed under seal. 
PROF. CAPRA:  On the issue of anonymous juries, I do not know, Lucy, 
what the reference was to the electronic access stuff that you let go by, but 
there is nothing in the rules that I know about that deals with anonymous 
juries—in the privacy rules. 
MS. DALGLISH:  My understanding is, it says, while the case is 
pending, you cannot get it, and afterwards you can go back and make an 
application.  Then, when the entire case is concluded somewhere down the 
line, you might be able to go back and do it. 
PROF. CAPRA:  That is not one of the Judicial Conference’s rules, in 
my understanding.  Is it? 
MS. DALGLISH:  I was told that it happened at the same time as the 
electronic court access rules. 
PROF. CAPRA:  I just think that it is a case-by-case approach.  Am I 
wrong, Judge? 
MS. DALGLISH:  No, it is not case-by-case. 
PROF. CAPRA:  In terms of what CACM has on this, is there anything 
on anonymous juries? 
MS. DALGLISH:  In other words, if I am a reporter, I can go to any 
federal court in the country while the jury is being selected and they have 
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just been empanelled, and I can go to the clerk of court’s office and say, 
“Can you tell me the names of the individuals on this jury?”  I am not aware 
of a single U.S. district court in this country that would let you have it while 
the case is going on. 
PROF. CAPRA:  I am just inquiring as to where this doctrine comes 
from.  Judge Huff wants to speak. 
JUDGE HUFF:  Isn’t there a ninety-day hold on filing transcripts to 
permit the redaction process to occur? 
JUDGE TUNHEIM:  There is, and transcripts of juror voir dire are 
generally set aside separately. 
PROF. CAPRA:  This is not an anonymous jury rule per se.  We are 
talking, really, about the transcripts, which leads us to the panel. 
MS. DALGLISH:  If you go and listen in court and attempt to catch their 
name, you can hear their name.  If you have missed jury selection and you 
want to go in to the clerk’s office and say, “Can I have a list of the folks 
who were empanelled?” they will tell you no.  I am telling you, this is going 
on all over the country.  I get about three phone calls a month. 
JUDGE TUNHEIM:  I am not aware of any rule or policy that affects 
that.  You are probably right.  In most instances, it depends on what the 
clerk’s office will turn over to you.  I think technically that should be 
available.  But it is not the subject of any rule or policy that I am aware of. 
PROF. CAPRA:  Mr. Hedges? 
MR. HEDGES:  The big debate going on these days now is in large 
trials, where there are extensive juror voir dires being done and there are 
pre-questionnaires being sent out.  A question that courts are facing is 
whether or not those questionnaires are things that should be available, 
especially now that a number are being offered electronically. 
The anonymous juries that I have seen are really ad hoc events because 
of concerns, generally, about organized crime.  The last time the Second 
Circuit really had a fight about that was the Martha Stewart trial four or five 
years ago. 
PROF. CAPRA:  In which the Second Circuit said that the judge had 
acted too broadly. 
MR. HEDGES:  That is right. 
JUDGE RAGGI:  I am sure we are going to discuss this more.  I think 
what you are talking about is what judges would not consider to be an 
anonymous jury. 
MS. DALGLISH:  You are right.  I misspoke. 
JUDGE RAGGI:  Just so we are all talking about the same thing.  
Because, as you yourself pointed out, the profession of journalism has 
changed so much.  A person who comes to the clerk’s office and says, 
“Could I have the names and addresses of the jury?” could be looking to do 
investigative reporting or could be up to mischief.  No clerk is probably just 
going to turn it over without making sure the judge wants it.  So in the end, 
that query is going to probably go to a judge, and then you are going to talk 
24 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
to a judge about why you want it and whether he is going to give it to you 
or not. 
PROF. CAPRA:  Thank you. 
I want to give Professor Reidenberg a chance to kind of sum up on this 
issue of limited usage.  Then we will close and get to the next panel. 
PROF. REIDENBERG:  Thanks, Dan. 
I think it is really a question of thinking about the disclosure and the uses 
that we associate with public access to the courts as really being part of our 
political checks and balances.  What are some of the uses?  Oversight of 
court fairness, oversight of court administration, uses connected with the 
litigation—that is the bankruptcy case. 
But now, when we talk about secrecy of the identity of jurors during a 
trial and the points you just raised, we get into other areas where we must 
be far more careful.  Is it okay, for example, that someone wants the names 
and addresses of jurors who are sitting on the jury because they want to sell 
them a particular cell phone service?  Suppose the cell company’s 
marketers discover that jurors, while they are sitting on juries, tend to be 
more susceptible to advertisements for text plans.  Is that the kind of world 
that we want to see?  I am very unsympathetic toward those types of 
releases. 
What about someone who wants to gain access to information from 
probate records to create lists for a dating service of widows and widowers 
who happen to be wealthy? 
If we start seeing too much secondary use or out of context use, if we 
start putting voir dire questionnaires in real time, online, in ways that are 
searchable from Bing, what will be the effect on the willingness of our 
citizens to participate in our legal system? 
PROF. CAPRA:  Is the technology available to limit that kind of 
motivational use? 
PROF. REIDENBERG:  Yes.  We can build the architectures.  But, we 
also need to build a legal structure that has some kind of sanction for the 
non-permissible uses. 
 
